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Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary

ENCJ Survey among lawyers on the independence of Judges 2025



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Summary

In 2025, the survey among the lawyers of Europe about the independence of the judiciary was conducted for the third time. The survey was organised in co-operation with the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), with the assistance of the Academy of European Law (ERA) in the final phase. While the previous survey achieved moderate success, the current survey fared worse. It proved again difficult to get lawyers to participate, despite the efforts of the ENCJ, CCBE and national bar and law societies. In total 3,307 lawyers participated, compared to 19,136 judges in the 2025 Judges Survey. Response was spread unevenly across the jurisdictions. Only eight countries had more than 100 replies. This report presents the outcomes for these eight countries, covering 2,400 respondents. The outcomes for these countries are of interest and, since the countries are spread across Europe, gives some insight into the perceptions of the lawyers. The eight countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. The outcomes must be interpreted with caution and are only indicative.

The low response rate among lawyers was an issue in earlier editions of the Survey, but the problem has become worse. In addition to the perceptions of citizens and judges about judicial independence, the perceptions of lawyers are particularly important, given their position in the legal system and their practical experience with the courts. In the future, other methods need to be considered to reach the lawyers.¹

¹ This report was composed by Frans van Dijk (ENCJ) and Bart Diephuis (Netherlands Council for the Judiciary) with the support of the ENCJ office in Brussels.

1. Introduction

Central to the mission of the ENCJ is the reinforcement of independent, yet accountable judiciaries in the European Union to guarantee access to fair, independent and impartial courts. To this end the ENCJ is working systematically to develop standards and guidelines for the governance of the judiciary and the conduct of essential functions such as the appointment of judges. To assess the extent to which standards and guidelines are realised a set of indicators on independence and accountability has been developed and implemented. These indicators focus, on the one hand, on the formal safeguards and mechanisms that protect judicial independence and provide for accountability and, on the other hand, on the perceptions of independence by stakeholders.² The lawyers are one of the groups of stakeholders.

For the third time, the ENCJ with the assistance of CCBE (and in the final stages of the Survey of ERA), conducted a survey among the lawyers of Europe about the independence of judges. The previous edition of the survey was in 2019.³ This survey was conducted in parallel to the [ENCJ survey among judges](#), which also took place in 2025.⁴ The survey asked the lawyers to give a general assessment of the independence of the judges in their country. It also asked them to assess the aspects that affect independence, of which it was thought they were able to observe these as lawyers. The survey also addressed some aspects of the accountability of the judiciary. The questions formulated for the lawyers are, as far as possible, the same as those included in the judges survey. The comparison of the views of judges and lawyers is particularly interesting to get a broader perspective on judicial independence and accountability.

Unfortunately, in most of the 29 jurisdictions the response was too low to be meaningful. Only in 8 jurisdictions more than 100 lawyers participated, with particular high scores in absolute numbers in Hungary (792) and Spain (645). As the opinions of lawyers on judicial independence are of interest for these 8 jurisdictions, the outcomes are presented in this report. As these jurisdictions are spread across Europe, the outcomes provide some insight into the differences in Europe. The outcomes that are presented need to be interpreted with great caution.

Before turning to the outcomes, in the next section the methodology of the survey is discussed. The outcomes are presented in sections 3 -9. Section 10 concludes. The Annex gives the outcomes of the survey in tables.

² For the most recent version of the indicators, see: ENCJ (2026), Indicators on independence, accountability and quality of the judiciary.

³ ENCJ (2019), Data survey among lawyers on the independence of judges.

⁴ ENCJ (2025), ENCJ Survey among Judges on the Independence of the Judiciary.

2. Methodology

Contentwise, the survey follows closely the judges survey. The members and observers of the ENCJ made the survey available in their languages. For each language a separate survey was created using SurveyMonkey. The links to the Survey in national languages was shared with the CCBE, which then asked all national bar and law societies to invite the lawyers to participate in the survey and provided them with a link to the survey in their language. As the response was low, the CCBE urged the national organisations to promote the survey several times, and the closing date of the survey was postponed. At the final stage of the Survey, the Academy of European Law was also invited to share the Survey with the lawyers in participating jurisdictions.

Despite these efforts, the response rate to the survey was very low. Only, in 8 countries more than 100 lawyers responded. See Table 1 for these countries. Latvia but also Slovenia and Hungary stand out with a high participation. While in these eight countries, countries where judicial independence faces challenges seem to be overrepresented, it cannot be concluded that problems experienced lead to higher participation, in particular because some countries with serious problems have low participation rates. A concern is the representativeness of the outcomes. Critical lawyers may be overrepresented, as they may have a stronger motivation to take the trouble to fill in the admittedly extensive questionnaire. It is clear, however, that other factors play a role, as other countries where one would expect many lawyers to be critical about the state of judicial independence have low participation.

In this report, only results are given for these eight countries. The eight countries are spread across the EU and this spread gives some insight into the differences in Europe.

Table 1 Number of respondents

Country	Number	Response rate	Country	Number	Response rate
Bulgaria	176	1.3%	Latvia	159	11.7%
Cyprus	150	3.2%	Portugal	113	0.3%
Denmark	230	3.1%	Slovenia	135	7.2%
Hungary	792	3.9%	Spain	645	0.4%
			Total	2,400	

Note: number of lawyers in 2022: Cepej (2024), European judicial systems; efficiency and quality of justice, Quantitative data.

It should be noted that the number of respondents relative to the total number of lawyers is low, in particular in Portugal and Spain. However, the total number of lawyers does not reflect the number of lawyers actually representing clients in court. While by definition⁵ lawyers are authorised to do so, many are primarily involved in advisory work. Statistically, the response for these eight countries is - in varying

⁵ See Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

degree - sufficient to be meaningful if self-selection does not play an important role. Especially, the latter aspect is cause to view the results as indicative.

As to the content, the survey was designed in such a way that it asked lawyers to give a general assessment of the independence of judges, to provide the data for the relevant Independence indicator, but also to explore a range of aspects of independence in depth. In addition, some questions concerned personal characteristics (gender and experience) or were work related (type of court the lawyer frequented and area of law). Three questions regarding accountability were included to fill in the accountability indicators.

Most questions were posed in the form of propositions. Unless indicated otherwise, answer categories were: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Not sure, Agree and Strongly agree.

3. Overall perception of independence of judges

The main question of the Survey concerns the perception of the independence of judges in general. On a 10-point scale, the participating lawyers rated the independence of the judges in their country on average between 4.2 for Bulgaria and 9.0 for Denmark. The other six countries have scores between 5.2 (Hungary) and 6.3 (Spain). See *Figure 1*. These scores are lower than the scores judges themselves attribute to the independence of the judges in their country. Differences range from 0.8 for Denmark to 3.3 for Cyprus and 3.0 for Portugal.




Figure 1 Independence of judges, according to lawyers




Figure 2 Change of independence

Figure 2 provides some insight into how the respondents perceive the development over time. More lawyers see a decline than an improvement. The positive exception is Latvia. Sharp declines are seen in Bulgaria and Hungary but also in Spain and Portugal.

Figure 3 explores the relationship between membership of the EU and judicial independence. Many respondents from Hungary, in particular, but also Bulgaria believe membership of the EU has not strengthened the independence of the Judiciary. Many respondents see a positive effect in Cyprus, Latvia and Portugal.

The independence of the judiciary in my country is strengthened by being part of the European Union, the prospect of becoming part of the European Union or being part of the EEA.




Figure 3 Impact of EU on independence

4. Implementation of judicial decisions

As was noted in earlier reports, independence cannot be separated from the authority of the judge. When judicial decisions are not executed, the independence of the judge may be guaranteed, but it has no practical value. In the survey lawyers were asked to give their assessment of the implementation by government of judicial decisions that go against the interests of that government. See *Figure 4*. In this case the outcomes for lawyers and for judges are similar and lawyers are not systematically more critical than judges.




Figure 4 Implementation of judicial decisions by government

5. Aspects of independence: case related

The relatively low scores on independence in general are reflected in low scores on diverse aspects of independence. The following figures illustrate this. Many lawyers report inappropriate pressure on judges to influence decisions in judicial procedures (see *Figure 5*). These outcomes are strikingly different from the outcomes of the judges. The vast majority of judges in Europe report that they do not experience inappropriate pressure. The fact that judges are perceived to be under inappropriate pressure does not say anything about whether or not they yield to that pressure.

When lawyers report that judges experience inappropriate pressure, the most given answers - across all countries - as to who exerts this pressure are 'government', 'media' and 'parties and their lawyers'.




Figure 5 Inappropriate pressure on judges

5.1 External pressure

Turning to external pressure, the first issue is corruption. Outcomes differ among the eight countries with high prevalence of corruption in Bulgaria and Hungary and very low prevalence in Denmark. The percentage that believes that corruption occurs on a regular basis is substantial (see *Figure 6*).




Figure 6 Judicial corruption




Figure 7 Ethical standards

Related to this is whether lawyers believe that judges adhere to high ethical standards. See *Figure 7*. Another related issue is the case allocation. While seemingly case allocation is an internal matter for the courts, it may be used in a way to influence the outcome of court cases and, therefore, it is at risk for corruption. *Figure 8* addresses this. In particular Hungary and Bulgaria score low in this respect.




Figure 8 Case allocation

A different but also important source of external influence on judicial decisions are media and social media (Figures 9 and 10). Many lawyers perceive an inappropriate impact on judicial decisions of, in particular, the traditional media. The impact of social media is seen as inappropriate by less respondents, but still by 60% in Hungary .




Figure 9 Inappropriate influence of the media




Figure 10 Inappropriate influence of social media

5.2 Internal pressure

Pressure from within the judiciary is likely to be more difficult to observe for lawyers who are external to the organisation. Therefore, the answer category is often 'not sure'. The focus is here on the influence of court management including the president of the court (Figure 11-13). The influence of court management may concern the content of judicial decisions, the timeliness of decisions and production targets.




Figure 11 Influence of court management on judicial decisions




Figure 12 Inappropriate influence of court management on the duration of cases




Figure 13 Inappropriate influence of court management on production targets

6. Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges

Very high percentages of lawyers believe that appointment and promotion decisions about judges are not only based on ability and experience. The following three figures present the outcomes. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia score particularly negative on all three questions, but other countries have low scores as well on one or two of the questions.




Figure 14 First appointment of judges




Figure 15 Appointment to Supreme Court




Figure 16 Promotion of judges

7. Aspects of judicial governance and accountability

The survey asks the perception of lawyers about the independence of the Council for the Judiciary (*Figure 17*). Again, Denmark scores high and Bulgaria very low with low scores of the other countries as well. The survey also contains the question whether the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures to defend judicial independence effectively. See *Figure 18*.

The answers of the lawyers are very much in line with the answers of the judges. *Figure 18* shows that many lawyers do not believe that protection is effective with percentages going up to 50% in Bulgaria and Spain. It should be noted that in countries in which judicial independence is not at stake, Councils have not been put to the test. This is likely to explain the large numbers of respondents that are unsure.




Figure 17 Independence of Council for the Judiciary




Figure 18 Mechanisms of Councils for the Judiciary to defend judicial independence

A second set of questions concerns the working conditions at the courts. In particular, caseload is seen by lawyers as detrimental for judicial independence. As to digitalization, stands out: 52% of the respondents see an impact on independence.

Table 2 Impact of working conditions on judicial independence: percentage pf lawyers who observe negative impact

	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Denmark	Hungary	Lativa	Portugal	Slovenia	Spain
Pay, pension, retirement age	16	14	5	55	19	27	32	21
Working hours	28	9	9	23	12	38	9	28
Caseload	29	38	20	41	43	55	26	43
Court Resources	19	28	26	31	28	37	32	30
Digitalization	14	20	8	52	14	22	19	26

Notes: 1. Question: during the last three years changes occurred in the working conditions of judges that negatively influenced their independence. Please indicate per category: agree, uncertain, disagree. 2. In each cell: % agree. For all answer categories see Tables 19-23 of the Annex.

Finally, under this heading, but closer to accountability are two questions how misconduct and corruption are dealt with by the judicial authorities (*Figure 19* and *20*). *Figure 6* dealt with judicial corruption and *Figure 7* with ethical standards. The related issues under the heading of accountability concerns the behaviour of the judicial authorities in addressing misconduct and corruption. Large percentages are quite negative. In particular, large percentages of lawyers believe that corruption is not effectively addressed (*Figure 20*). Bulgaria stands out (80%), followed by Portugal (69%).




Figure 19 Handling of judicial misconduct by the judicial authorities




Figure 20 Handling of judicial corruption by judicial authorities

8. Respect for judicial independence

Three groups of actors are distinguished: (1) the governance bodies of the Judiciary and other leadership like Supreme Court, (2) parties, lawyers and prosecution and (3) politics and media, consisting of government, Parliament, media and social media. The lawyers were asked about their perception of the respect for judicial independence of these actors, including their own profession. Table 3 gives the percentage of the lawyers who agree that judicial independence is respected by each of the actors.

Table 3 Perceptions of lawyers on respect for judicial independence by three groups of actors, percentage of lawyers who agree that independence is respected.

	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Denmark	Hungary	Latvia	Portugal	Slovenia	Spain
Council for the Judiciary	19		82	36	43	26	36	38
Court Management	28	39	75	25	26	25	28	41
Constitutional Court	48			20	63	44	36	27
Supreme Court	44	41	91	22	39	34	28	42
Association of Judges	54	46	86	60	49	34	43	48
Parties to procedure	26	28	76	39	40	38	21	51
Lawyers	55	41	87	79	74	55	42	71
Prosecution	18	36	76	17	25	30	32	29
Parliament	7	27	66	17	17	26	9	14
Government	7	26	67	16	19	31	8	16
Media	14	13	60	25	15	24	6	9
Social Media	16	11	32	24	10	19	6	8

Notes: 1. Question: in the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by groups of actors.
2. in each cell: % agrees. For all answer categories see Tables 26-37 of the Annex.

In this selection of countries Denmark stands out with high and very consistent percentages of lawyers who feel that judicial independence is respected by the distinguished groups. Still, political actors and the media score lower than the other two groups. In particular, social media are not perceived to be respectful with a large percentage of respondents being uncertain. In all other jurisdictions, very few respondents perceive the political actors to respect judicial independence. The same holds for the media.

In addition, in Hungary few lawyers perceive that the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court respect judicial independence.

9. Characteristics of respondents

The Survey contains questions concerning the characteristics of respondents. These are relevant in as far as they may affect the outcome of the survey. Experience with different types of courts or areas of law may differ. If this is the case, under- or overrepresentation of lawyers with experience in specific courts or areas of law relative to other countries may affect outcomes, although this can also reflect differences in the caseload at the courts. It should be noted first that nearly all lawyers that participated in the survey actually do cases at the courts, and thus have direct experience (Figure 23). Furthermore it should be noted that there are substantial differences between types of courts (Figure 24), where the appeal courts seem to be overrepresented, except for Cyprus and Portugal. The differences between areas of law is a more complicated matter, as judicial systems differ, for instance with respect to specialisation. The differences seem to be small.




Figure 21 Gender of respondents




Figure 22 Experience as a lawyer





Figure 23 Frequency of interaction with the courts

Figure 24 Type of court




Figure 25 Area of law

10. Conclusions

The survey shows that it is difficult to reach and motivate lawyers to express opinions about the independence of the Judiciary. Nonetheless, in several jurisdictions this motivation did exist and not only in countries where independence is under heavy pressure. However, even for these jurisdictions, the results must be interpreted with caution and are only indicative. The outcomes presented here for eight countries are country-specific and, therefore, foremost of national interest. A general finding is that, as seen before, lawyers are more critical than judges about the performance of the judiciary with respect to independence. This difference is small in Denmark and high in countries that score low on independence. This is not caused by lawyers being inherently negative, as in some questions that do not concern judicial performance lawyers and judges score largely the same. Qualitatively, the opinions of lawyers and judges do not differ much, for instance as to the comparison of jurisdictions. Another general finding concerns the perceived respect for independence by groups of actors. Most respondents are of the opinion that political actors and the (social) media are less respectful of judicial independence than the leadership of the judiciary and the parties and their lawyers in the court room.

From a methodological perspective, the conclusion is that the current method and/or the way the Survey is carried out are not effective to solicit opinions of lawyers on judicial independence for the broad range of jurisdictions of Europe. As the observations and opinions of lawyers are of major interest for the study of judicial independence, a re-evaluation of the methodology is required.

Annex Results per question in tables

Overall perception of independence⁶

1. Rate the independence of the professional judges in your country on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").

	Response	Av	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Bulgaria	140	4,2	9%	8%	7%	13%	13%	19%	11%	13%	6%	1%	0%
Cyprus	122	5,9	4%	2%	4%	7%	9%	16%	14%	12%	17%	3%	10%
Denmark	215	9,0	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	3%	1%	6%	9%	28%	50%
Hungary	631	5,2	6%	5%	8%	13%	9%	14%	8%	12%	7%	6%	11%
Latvia	134	6,0	3%	2%	5%	6%	4%	12%	15%	25%	18%	6%	4%
Portugal	93	5,6	3%	4%	5%	5%	6%	26%	9%	14%	14%	13%	0%
Slovenia	115	5,6	3%	8%	3%	6%	13%	11%	10%	15%	20%	9%	2%
Spain	541	6,3	6%	2%	3%	4%	8%	11%	11%	14%	20%	13%	8%
Total	1,991												

2. Since I started as a lawyer the independence of the courts has:

	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Bulgaria	138	40%	26%	22%	9%	3%
Cyprus	120	19%	25%	32%	18%	6%
Denmark	215	4%	20%	68%	7%	1%
Hungary	617	52%	20%	14%	5%	9%
Latvia	132	15%	15%	22%	31%	17%
Portugal	93	30%	37%	29%	4%	0%
Slovenia	114	20%	29%	37%	11%	3%
Spain	533	39%	31%	24%	4%	1%
Total	1,962					

3. The independence of the judiciary in my country is strengthened by being part of the European Union, the prospect of becoming part of the European Union or being part of the EEA.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	140	34%	19%	47%
Cyprus	122	52%	17%	30%
Denmark	215	29%	45%	26%
Hungary	635	21%	15%	64%
Latvia	135	55%	32%	13%
Portugal	94	41%	34%	24%
Slovenia	115	31%	30%	38%
Spain	541	37%	21%	43%
Total	1,997			

⁶ The response per question varies. The highest response occurs on the questions about the personal characteristics of the respondents (Tables 38-42).

4. In the last three years judgements that went against the interests of the government were usually implemented/enforced in my country.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	140	14%	29%	57%
Cyprus	122	30%	27%	43%
Denmark	215	65%	18%	17%
Hungary	635	24%	28%	48%
Latvia	135	19%	64%	18%
Portugal	94	23%	36%	40%
Slovenia	115	33%	42%	25%
Spain	541	33%	15%	52%
Total	1,997			

Aspects of independence

5. During the last three years judges have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way.

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	Not sure	Disagree
Bulgaria	165	23%	35%	4%	23%	15%
Cyprus	145	12%	28%	2%	28%	30%
Denmark	228	3%	6%	3%	10%	79%
Hungary	757	28%	27%	3%	16%	26%
Latvia	156	13%	33%	3%	31%	20%
Portugal	106	14%	27%	0%	25%	34%
Slovenia	131	15%	18%	2%	27%	39%
Spain	604	31%	28%	2%	15%	24%
Total	2,292					

6. During the last three years judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts/favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	161	67%	27%	6%
Cyprus	143	19%	41%	41%
Denmark	228	3%	6%	91%
Hungary	750	65%	11%	24%
Latvia	155	23%	54%	23%
Portugal	106	23%	33%	44%
Slovenia	129	36%	33%	31%
Spain	600	27%	27%	46%
Total	2,272			

7. Judges adhere to high ethical standards.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	14%	33%	53%
Cyprus	120	30%	32%	38%
Denmark	215	85%	5%	10%
Hungary	617	46%	34%	20%
Latvia	132	25%	39%	36%
Portugal	93	25%	20%	55%
Slovenia	114	33%	30%	37%
Spain	533	53%	22%	25%
Total	1,962			

8. Decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i. e. press, television or radio).

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	149	64%	26%	11%
Cyprus	137	37%	33%	30%
Denmark	223	16%	9%	75%
Hungary	730	71%	6%	23%
Latvia	155	55%	26%	19%
Portugal	101	64%	23%	13%
Slovenia	125	52%	34%	14%
Spain	580	47%	22%	31%
Total	2,200			

9. Decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by actual, or anticipated, social media postings (for example, on Facebook, X or LinkedIn).

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	149	32%	42%	26%
Cyprus	137	27%	36%	37%
Denmark	223	8%	17%	75%
Hungary	730	62%	14%	24%
Latvia	155	34%	38%	28%
Portugal	101	43%	39%	19%
Slovenia	125	22%	38%	40%
Spain	580	32%	29%	39%
Total	2.200			

10. During the last three years cases have been allocated to judges other than in accordance with established rules or procedures in order to influence the outcome of the particular case.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	149	64%	26%	10%
Cyprus	137	19%	42%	39%
Denmark	223	3%	15%	82%
Hungary	730	68%	13%	19%
Latvia	155	26%	45%	30%
Portugal	101	40%	31%	30%
Slovenia	125	45%	30%	26%
Spain	580	26%	27%	47%
Total	2,200			

11. During the last three years the management of the court has exerted pressure on judges to decide individual cases in a particular way.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	140	53%	40%	7%
Cyprus	122	43%	30%	26%
Denmark	215	5%	24%	72%
Hungary	635	52%	20%	28%
Latvia	135	39%	44%	17%
Portugal	94	38%	40%	21%
Slovenia	115	32%	39%	29%
Spain	541	37%	29%	33%
Total	1,997			

12. During the last three years the management of the court has exerted inappropriate pressure on judges to decide individual cases within a particular time.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	140	46%	41%	14%
Cyprus	122	52%	25%	23%
Denmark	215	17%	37%	46%
Hungary	635	64%	15%	21%
Latvia	135	42%	47%	10%
Portugal	94	47%	35%	18%
Slovenia	115	43%	32%	24%
Spain	541	37%	36%	27%
Total	1,997			

13. During the last three years the management of the court has exerted inappropriate pressure on judges to reach production targets (number of adjudicated cases).

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	140	36%	46%	18%
Cyprus	122	52%	25%	23%
Denmark	215	17%	47%	36%
Hungary	635	22%	18%	60%
Latvia	135	40%	54%	6%
Portugal	94	60%	28%	13%
Slovenia	115	42%	38%	20%
Spain	541	37%	42%	21%
Total	1,997			

14. Judges in my country have entered the judiciary on first appointment other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	149	77%	19%	5%
Cyprus	137	66%	18%	16%
Denmark	223	11%	11%	78%
Hungary	730	33%	31%	36%
Latvia	155	37%	30%	32%
Portugal	101	62%	24%	14%
Slovenia	125	62%	22%	16%
Spain	580	34%	24%	42%
Total	2,200			

15. Judges have been appointed to the Supreme Court/Court of cassation other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	149	74%	19%	6%
Cyprus	137	54%	23%	23%
Denmark	223	7%	11%	83%
Hungary	730	37%	36%	27%
Latvia	155	38%	31%	31%
Portugal	101	58%	28%	14%
Slovenia	125	62%	25%	14%
Spain	580	68%	14%	18%
Total	2,200			

16. Judges in first instance and appeal courts have been promoted/appointed to another position other than on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years (experience may include seniority).

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	149	77%	19%	4%
Cyprus	137	58%	22%	20%
Denmark	223	9%	15%	76%
Hungary	730	41%	32%	28%
Latvia	155	37%	35%	28%
Portugal	101	50%	35%	16%
Slovenia	125	62%	28%	10%
Spain	580	47%	26%	27%
Total	2,200			

17. Only answer if there exists a Council for the judiciary in your country:

On a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "the highest possible degree of independence). The Council for the judiciary in my country is:

	Response	Av	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Bulgaria	131	2,5	33%	20%	9%	9%	4%	11%	4%	5%	2%	2%	2%
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	214	7,7	2%	0%	2%	0%	4%	10%	6%	11%	21%	21%	23%
Hungary	615	5,1	11%	7%	7%	10%	6%	14%	7%	10%	9%	7%	11%
Latvia	132	5,5	5%	8%	5%	9%	8%	16%	9%	11%	14%	11%	5%
Portugal	92	4,9	5%	11%	7%	10%	8%	18%	9%	10%	13%	7%	3%
Slovenia	115	5,3	3%	9%	5%	13%	6%	17%	9%	11%	14%	10%	3%
Spain	531	3,9	18%	13%	8%	8%	7%	17%	8%	7%	8%	4%	3%
Total	1,830												

18. Only answer if there exists a Council for the Judiciary in your country: I believe that in my country the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures in order to defend judicial independence effectively.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	134	26%	22%	51%
Cyprus	-	-	-	-
Denmark	214	53%	29%	18%
Hungary	312	20%	42%	38%
Latvia	132	30%	50%	20%
Portugal	93	39%	27%	34%
Slovenia	113	32%	41%	27%
Spain	533	29%	19%	51%
Total	1,531			

19. During the last three years changes occurred in the working conditions of judges that negatively influenced their independence. Please indicate per category: Pay, pension, retirement age.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree – Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	141	16%	20%	64%
Cyprus	127	14%	28%	57%
Denmark	218	5%	42%	54%
Hungary	641	55%	27%	18%
Latvia	138	19%	33%	48%
Portugal	95	27%	38%	35%
Slovenia	117	32%	21%	46%
Spain	548	21%	41%	38%
Total	2,025	24%	31%	45%

20. During the last three years changes occurred in the working conditions of judges that negatively influenced their independence. Please indicate per category: Working hours.

	Response	Agree – Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	141	18%	24%	57%
Cyprus	127	9%	29%	62%
Denmark	218	9%	40%	50%
Hungary	641	23%	47%	30%
Latvia	138	12%	40%	49%
Portugal	95	38%	28%	34%
Slovenia	117	9%	22%	68%
Spain	548	28%	36%	36%
Total	2,025			

21. During the last three years changes occurred in the working conditions of judges that negatively influenced their independence. Please indicate per category: Caseload

	Response	Agree – Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	141	29%	31%	40%
Cyprus	127	38%	23%	39%
Denmark	218	20%	36%	44%
Hungary	641	41%	32%	26%
Latvia	138	43%	30%	27%
Portugal	95	55%	21%	24%
Slovenia	117	26%	32%	42%
Spain	548	43%	28%	29%
Total	2,025			

22. During the last three years changes occurred in the working conditions of judges that negatively influenced their independence. Please indicate per category: Court Resources

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	141	19%	29%	52%
Cyprus	127	28%	28%	44%
Denmark	218	26%	30%	44%
Hungary	641	31%	34%	34%
Latvia	138	28%	38%	34%
Portugal	95	37%	33%	31%
Slovenia	117	32%	27%	40%
Spain	548	30%	36%	34%
Total	2,025			

23. During the last three years changes occurred in the working conditions of judges that negatively influenced their independence. Please indicate per category: Digitalization

	Response	Agree – Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	141	14%	28%	57%
Cyprus	127	20%	26%	54%
Denmark	218	8%	41%	50%
Hungary	641	52%	28%	20%
Latvia	138	14%	38%	48%
Portugal	95	22%	31%	47%
Slovenia	117	19%	31%	50%
Spain	548	26%	37%	37%
Total	2,025			

24. Judicial misconduct is appropriately dealt with by the judicial authorities.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	9%	30%	61%
Cyprus	120	22%	22%	57%
Denmark	215	51%	36%	13%
Hungary	617	28%	37%	35%
Latvia	132	20%	32%	48%
Portugal	93	11%	16%	73%
Slovenia	114	12%	24%	64%
Spain	533	19%	28%	53%
Total	1,962			

25. Judicial corruption is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	2%	18%	80%
Cyprus	120	23%	26%	52%
Denmark	215	67%	27%	6%
Hungary	617	35%	40%	25%
Latvia	132	34%	38%	28%
Portugal	93	8%	24%	69%
Slovenia	114	15%	31%	54%
Spain	533	31%	23%	46%
Total	1.962			

Respect for independence

26. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Association of Judges

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	137	54%	40%	6%
Cyprus	118	46%	41%	14%
Denmark	214	86%	12%	2%
Hungary	624	60%	23%	17%
Latvia	132	49%	44%	7%
Portugal	93	34%	44%	22%
Slovenia	113	43%	38%	19%
Spain	542	48%	21%	31%
Total	1,973			

27. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Constitutional Court

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	137	48%	38%	14%
Cyprus	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-
Hungary	631	20%	13%	68%
Latvia	135	63%	26%	11%
Portugal	94	44%	40%	16%
Slovenia	114	36%	31%	33%
Spain	539	27%	19%	54%
Total	1,650			

28. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Council for the Judiciary

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	134	19%	38%	43%
Cyprus	-	-	-	-
Denmark	215	82%	14%	4%
Hungary	635	36%	29%	34%
Latvia	136	43%	35%	23%
Portugal	94	26%	37%	37%
Slovenia	113	36%	40%	24%
Spain	540	38%	23%	39%
Total	1,867			

29. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Court Management incl Court President

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	28%	40%	33%
Cyprus	123	39%	39%	22%
Denmark	215	75%	20%	4%
Hungary	638	25%	29%	47%
Latvia	137	26%	46%	28%
Portugal	93	25%	47%	28%
Slovenia	117	28%	35%	37%
Spain	541	41%	27%	32%
Total	2,002			

30. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Government

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	7%	27%	66%
Cyprus	127	26%	33%	41%
Denmark	216	67%	9%	24%
Hungary	638	16%	6%	78%
Latvia	136	19%	37%	44%
Portugal	94	31%	28%	41%
Slovenia	115	8%	29%	63%
Spain	542	16%	9%	75%
Total	2,006			

31. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Lawyers

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	55%	29%	16%
Cyprus	127	41%	25%	34%
Denmark	215	87%	5%	8%
Hungary	630	79%	14%	6%
Latvia	137	74%	18%	7%
Portugal	94	55%	26%	19%
Slovenia	114	42%	39%	19%
Spain	535	71%	18%	11%
Total	1,990			

32. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Media (i.e. press, television or radio)

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	140	14%	41%	46%
Cyprus	127	13%	39%	48%
Denmark	216	60%	13%	27%
Hungary	635	25%	27%	48%
Latvia	137	15%	36%	49%
Portugal	95	24%	20%	56%
Slovenia	114	6%	32%	62%
Spain	541	9%	13%	77%
Total	2,005			

33. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Parliament

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	7%	35%	59%
Cyprus	127	27%	39%	34%
Denmark	216	66%	9%	25%
Hungary	636	17%	9%	74%
Latvia	135	17%	41%	42%
Portugal	94	26%	32%	43%
Slovenia	116	9%	30%	61%
Spain	541	14%	18%	69%
Total	2,003			

34. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Parties to the procedure

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	137	26%	45%	29%
Cyprus	127	28%	29%	43%
Denmark	212	76%	14%	10%
Hungary	610	39%	42%	19%
Latvia	137	40%	36%	24%
Portugal	95	38%	32%	31%
Slovenia	117	21%	40%	38%
Spain	540	51%	27%	22%
Total	1,975			

35. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Prosecution

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	138	18%	25%	57%
Cyprus	127	36%	30%	34%
Denmark	214	76%	16%	8%
Hungary	638	17%	19%	63%
Latvia	137	25%	31%	45%
Portugal	94	30%	32%	38%
Slovenia	116	32%	34%	34%
Spain	540	29%	21%	50%
Total	2,004			

36. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Social Media (for example Facebook, X or LinkedIn)

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	140	16%	47%	37%
Cyprus	127	11%	39%	50%
Denmark	207	32%	38%	29%
Hungary	628	24%	35%	41%
Latvia	132	10%	52%	39%
Portugal	94	19%	35%	46%
Slovenia	112	6%	37%	57%
Spain	539	8%	22%	71%
Total	1,979			

37. In the last three years, the independence of the judges has been respected by: Supreme Court

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Bulgaria	137	44%	41%	15%
Cyprus	126	41%	32%	27%
Denmark	214	91%	7%	2%
Hungary	635	22%	17%	61%
Latvia	137	39%	40%	21%
Portugal	94	34%	47%	19%
Slovenia	117	28%	41%	31%
Spain	537	42%	25%	33%
Total	1,997			

Characteristics of respondents

38. Gender

	Response	Did not answer	I identify otherwise	Male	Female
Bulgaria	176	2%	0%	43%	56%
Cyprus	150	7%	1%	45%	48%
Denmark	230	0%	0%	71%	28%
Hungary	792	2%	0%	57%	41%
Latvia	159	3%	0%	48%	49%
Portugal	113	4%	0%	42%	54%
Slovenia	135	3%	0%	49%	48%
Spain	645	3%	0%	59%	37%
Total	2,400				

39. Experience as lawyer

	Response	0-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	25-30 years	Over 30 years
Bulgaria	176	18%	20%	13%	14%	15%	10%	10%
Cyprus	150	25%	23%	21%	11%	5%	7%	9%
Denmark	230	14%	9%	9%	14%	9%	15%	30%
Hungary	792	10%	11%	11%	14%	14%	15%	25%
Latvia	159	9%	9%	12%	30%	16%	14%	10%
Portugal	113	14%	14%	11%	13%	19%	7%	21%
Slovenia	135	14%	10%	21%	24%	9%	12%	10%
Spain	645	7%	7%	9%	10%	12%	18%	37%
Total	2,400							

40. Primarily interaction with:

	Response	Court of first instance	Appeal court	Supreme Court
Bulgaria	176	90%	9%	2%
Cyprus	150	95%	1%	3%
Denmark	230	89%	10%	2%
Hungary	792	93%	5%	2%
Latvia	159	87%	11%	2%
Portugal	113	98%	2%	0%
Slovenia	135	94%	4%	1%
Spain	645	91%	7%	2%
Total	2,400			

41. Area of law:

	Response	Administrative cases	Civil (including family) cases	Criminal cases	Civil and criminal cases in equal measure	Civil, administrative and criminal cases in equal measure
Bulgaria	176	4%	56%	7%	9%	24%
Cyprus	150	5%	51%	7%	17%	21%
Denmark	230	8%	71%	11%	6%	5%
Hungary	792	8%	59%	13%	12%	9%
Latvia	159	1%	36%	31%	16%	15%
Portugal	113	6%	29%	15%	35%	15%
Slovenia	135	4%	63%	4%	15%	14%
Spain	645	12%	35%	10%	26%	17%
Total	2,400					

42. Frequency of contact with the courts

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Never
Bulgaria	176	84%	16%	0%
Cyprus	150	81%	18%	1%
Denmark	230	66%	29%	5%
Hungary	792	74%	26%	1%
Latvia	159	94%	6%	1%
Portugal	113	82%	18%	0%
Slovenia	135	81%	19%	0%
Spain	645	87%	12%	1%
Total	2,400			